





 Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II 
 University of the Basque Country 
 Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83 





DFAE-II WP Series 
 
 
Steven P. CASSOU & Arantza GOROSTIAGA 
 
Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Multisector Model 
with Minimum Fiscal Expenditure 
Requirements 
2007-01 
ISSN: pending Optimal ￿scal policy in a multisector model




Universidad del Pa￿s Vasco
March 15, 2007
Abstract
This paper investigates optimal ￿scal policy in a static multisector model. A
Ramsey type planner chooses tax rates on each good type as well as spending
levels on each good type subject to an exogenous total expenditure constraint
and requirements that some minimum amount of spending be undertaken in each
sector. It is shown that optimal policy does not equally spend in each sector
but instead results in one of the minimum expenditure constraints binding.
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At least since Ramsey (1927), it is well known that the tax structure has important
e⁄ects on welfare. It was here that economists ￿rst learned one of the principal
￿ndings of public ￿nance, that e¢ cient taxes will be highest on goods with the lowest
elasticities. But Ramsey (1927) did more than contribute to our understanding of
tax structure. Perhaps equally important, this paper provided what is now one of
the standard approaches for formulating optimal tax problems.1
The original Ramsey formulation suggested that a policy planner would choose
commodity taxes which would minimize welfare losses and provide su¢ cient rev-
enue to the government to ￿nance an exogenous spending program. As economists
have become more interested in dynamic models, the Ramsey formulation has been
adapted to dynamic settings and led to new dynamic results. Lucas and Stokey
(1983) ￿rst generalized Ramsey￿ s approach to present a dynamic stochastic model
and study the structure and time consistency of optimal ￿scal and monetary policy
and a number of papers have further extended this theoretical framework. Chari and
Kehoe (1999) review the most important contributions of this literature.2
Other extensions of the Ramsey optimal tax formulation have investigated the
spending side of the planners budget.3 In this paper, we also extend the Ramsey
1An important alternative approach was suggested by Mirrlees (1971) which has also generated a
vigorous recent literature with work by Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003), Kocherlakota
(2005) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006).
2A branch of special relevance within this literature has been that analyzing optimal taxation on
capital. Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) showed that long run capital tax rates should be zero. This
issue has been further studied in more general theoretical setups. For instance, Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1994) include aggregate shocks, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) consider human capital
accumulation and endogenous growth and Erosa and Gervais (2002) use an overlapping generation
model.
3Several papers have studied the properties and implications of the optimal policy when a public
consumption good is assumed. Among them, Turnovsky (1996) studies the role of a tax on con-
sumption in enhancing growth and welfare, Judd (1999) characterizes the optimal tax on capital
in the long run, Gorostiaga (2003, 2005) describe the optimal policy under non-competitive labor
markets, and Cassou and Lansing (2006) study the e⁄ect of tax reforms in an endogenous growth
model. Other papers introduce government spending in the model as a productive input. For in-
stance, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997) study the size of optimal tax rates on capital, Fisher
and Turnovsky (1998) analyze the impact of public investment on private capital accumulation, and
Cassou and Lansing (1998, 1999) explore the relationship between nonoptimal ￿scal policies and the
observed productivity slowdown.
1formulation into the spending side, but in a way not yet investigated. Here we assume
that government spending has no utility or production bene￿ts as in Ramsey (1927),
but in addition to choosing taxes, we allow the planner to choose the composition of
its exogenous spending program. Although it is possible to explore this structure in
a dynamic model, the presentation here is done in a static context since this allows for
a clean and clear understanding of the results.4 We also found that using a simple
logarithmic utility function led to even greater analytically tractable and greater
intuitive clarity so most of the paper focuses on this simple case.
One might expect that a planner faced with a choice over spending composition
would choose some combination of the goods, but it is shown that in fact the planner
￿nds it attractive to focus spending on one or the other good. Minimum expenditure
constraints can be added to the planners problem to insure a mix of spending on the
di⁄erent goods. In such a case, we show that the planner always ￿nds it attractive
to force one of the minimum expenditure constraints to bind.
Although this result is surprising, the intuition is rather simple. Because the
planner gets no bene￿t from the goods it consumes, one can interpret the government
consumption bundle as consisting of goods that are perfectly substitutable with each
other. On the other hand, consumers do get utility from consuming goods. So,
given that the planner must spend at least a certain exogenous amount on goods, the
planner can maximize agent utility by purchasing as much of the most expensive good
as possible. This results in one of the minimum expenditure constraints binding.
To present these results in a clear format, we have organized the paper as follows.
Section 2 presents the formal structure of the logarithmic utility model. This sim-
ple formulation allows analytical tractability, and formal results for this model are
presented in Section 3. Section 4 goes on to investigate more general utility speci￿-
cations which are not analytically tractable. In this section it is shown graphically
that the formal results appear to be robust to the more general utility formulations.
4Cassou, Gorostiaga, GutiØrrez and Hamilton (2006) investigate a dynamic model with some
similarities to the one here in an environmental context.
22 The Model
In this section we describe the corporate, consumer and government sectors and then
formally specify the competitive equilibrium. This structure is then used to describe
the Ramsey planner￿ s problem as a choice of policy variables so as to maximize
consumer utility subject to the economy being in a competitive equilibrium.
2.1 The corporate sector
The corporate sector consists of two types of producers who manufacture di⁄erent
goods. We index the producers by j and distinguish the sectors by j = a;b and
assume there is an equal number of ￿rms from each sector as there are consumers.5






j for j = a;b; (1)
where ￿j 2 (0;1) and yj, kj and lj denote output, capital input and labor input in
sector j = a;b. In this formulation, when ￿a 6= ￿b; capital and labor inputs have
di⁄erent productive characteristics across sectors. This di⁄erence in the ability to
produce goods is essential to our results.
We assume that capital and labor are free to move between sectors or between
￿rms and are allocated according to whichever sector or ￿rm pays the highest return.
This has the e⁄ect of equating returns so that
r = rj = pj￿j
yj
kj
for j = a;b; (2)
w = wj = pj(1 ￿ ￿j)
yj
lj
for j = a;b; (3)
where r and w denote the market capital rental rate and market wage rate and rj,
wj and pj denote the jth sector capital rental rate, wage rate and price of output.
We will use the a good as the numeraire, so pa = 1.
5Such an assumption is common in models emphasizing competitive price taking agents and is
in part justi￿ed when production exhibits constant returns to scale. This assumption allows us to
focus on a representative agent running each type of ￿rm and a reprentative consumer consuming
goods, all of whom are price takers.
32.2 The consumer sector
The consumer sector consists of many identical agents who each own k units of capital
and l units of labor which is provided to the corporate sector in exchange for capital
and labor income. This income is then used to purchase two types of consumption
goods, ca and cb which yield utility according to
U(ca;cb) = lnca + lncb: (4)
Choices for consumption bundles are based upon a budget constraint given by
X
j=a;b







where ￿j is a consumption tax chosen by the government and applied to consumption
of good j. This constraint shows that income received on the right side of the budget
constraint is used to purchase consumption goods on the left side of the budget
constraint.
2.3 The government sector
The government engages in two types of activities. First, the government purchases
goods from sector j at a level denoted by gj ￿ 0. These purchases are assumed to
be nonproductive in utility and production. Second, the government chooses a tax
policy which raises revenue to ￿nance its expenditures. The tax instruments available
for this purpose consist of the consumption taxes on each of the consumption goods
which were introduced above. We interpret negative values for a tax as a subsidy.















4where ￿ ￿ 0.
In addition, we assume that the government spreads its expenditures between
the two sectors. This is imposed by assuming that there are minimum values for ￿a
and ￿b where ￿j =
gj
yj for j = a;b. We will denote these minimums by ￿M
a and ￿M
b
and formally write the constraint as
￿j ￿ ￿M
j for j = a;b and t ￿ 0: (8)
A natural minimum value is zero, as values less than zero imply the government is
able to manufacture goods without a production function. In some cases we will
assume minimum values larger than zero and motivate this as the outcome of some
exogenous political process that not only chooses ￿ but also ensures that this spending
is spread around on all types of goods. In other words, lobbyists for each industry
ensure that their sector receives some minimum level of spending. In this set up, a
situation in which lobbyists for each industry are equally e⁄ective could be imposed
by assuming that ￿a = ￿b = ￿.
2.4 Competitive equilibrium
There are several types of market clearance conditions. First, input market clearance










Second, goods market clearance requires that
cj + gj = yj for j = a;b: (11)
A competitive equilibrium is de￿ned by the following. Given a capital stock k and
a labor supply l, allocations fkj;lj;cj;yj : j = a;bg, prices frj;wj;pj : j = a;bg and
government policies f￿j;gj;￿j;: j = a;bg and ￿, constitute a competitive equilibrium
if the following conditions are satis￿ed:
5(i) Given prices frj;wj;pj : j = a;bg and taxes f￿j : j = a;bg the allocation
fkj;lj;cj : j = a;bg maximizes the consumer objective function (4) subject the
budget constraints (5), (9) and (10).
(ii) For each ￿rm j = a;b, given prices rj;wj;pj the allocation kj;lj;yj maximizes
its pro￿ts.
(iv) The government budget constraint (6), spending requirement (7) and minimum
expenditure constraint (8) hold.
(v) The capital, labor and goods markets clear as given in (9), (10) and (11).6
2.5 The Ramsey Problem
In the original formulation by Ramsey (1927), a planner who chose taxes so as to
￿nance an exogenous spending program and minimize deadweight losses was envi-
sioned. Since this pioneering work, economists have extended the Ramsey formula-
tion to include dynamic aspects as well as consider a planner that chooses government
spending on various types of productive activities. Here we also consider spending
elements, but with a di⁄erent twist than these other studies. In particular, gov-
ernment spending is assumed to be non productive as in Ramsey￿ s original work.
However, here we allow the planner to choose how it wishes to allocate its spending
among the various types of goods. In particular, we consider a planner who takes ￿
as given, and chooses f￿j;gj;￿j;: j = a;bg so as to maximize consumer utility given
by (4) and subject to the requirements of the de￿nition of a competitive equilibrium.
3 Optimal policy




for j = a;b: (12)
6Equations (9) and (10) appear as both consumer budget constraints and as market clearance
conditions because of the representative agent set up used here.
6Next note that equality of rental rates between the two production sectors implies









It is possible to characterize the equilibrium allocation of capital and labor in various
ways, but for our purposes it will be useful to write them as functions of ￿scal policy
variables. Furthermore, as will be seen shortly, it is useful to write these expressions
in terms of the particular ￿scal variables ￿a and ￿a. Given ￿a, ￿a and ￿, values of ￿b
and ￿b are implied by (6) and (7). We summarize these expressions in the following
Lemma.




[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a
k; (14)
kb =
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b








[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b)
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
l: (17)
We can now use the expressions from Lemma 1 to obtain production levels, con-
sumption expressions and utility function values as functions of ￿scal policy. We ￿nd
the utility function expression useful for our purposes and summarize the behavior
of this as a function of ￿scal policy variables in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For any value of ￿a, the derivative of the utility function with respect




￿2[(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](￿b ￿ ￿a)
2
(1 ￿ ￿a)[[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a][[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)]
:
Proposition 1 then implies the following corollary.
Corollary 1: For any value of ￿a:
71. If ￿a = ￿b, then @U
@￿a = 0 for all ￿a.
2. If ￿a 6= ￿b, then (a) @U
@￿a = 0 for ￿a = ￿a
1+￿a; (b) @U
@￿a > 0 for ￿a > ￿a
1+￿a; and
(c) @U
@￿a < 0 for ￿a < ￿a
1+￿a.
Because Corollary 1 holds for any value of ￿a; it will hold at the Ramsey solution
as well. This means part 2 of Corollary 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2: If ￿a 6= ￿b, then the solution to the Ramsey problem will always
occur when one of the minimum expenditure constraints is binding.
To understand Corollary 2 intuitively, ￿rst note that one can substitute (14) and
(15) into (13) and then make use of two production expressions from the appendix
given by (24) and (25) to get
pb =
￿￿a
a (1 ￿ ￿a)(1￿￿a)
￿
￿b
b (1 ￿ ￿b)(1￿￿b) ￿
￿
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)





This expression shows that when [2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1] = 1 (i.e. ￿a = ￿a
1+￿a),
the price equals the price that would be achieved in a no government situation (i.e.
￿ = ￿a = ￿b = ￿a = ￿b = 0). Because of this, we will interpret [2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 +
￿a) ￿ 1] = 1 as a baseline for the following discussion. Note, that as ￿a rises (falls),
[2(1￿￿a)(1+￿a)￿1] falls (rises). So we can approach the comparative statics from






a (1 ￿ ￿a)(1￿￿a)
￿
￿b
b (1 ￿ ￿b)(1￿￿b)
￿
￿2(1 + ￿a)(￿b ￿ ￿a)2







[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)




8and that this derivative is always negative.7 This implies that as ￿a rises from the
baseline, the price of the b good falls, implying the b good is relatively cheaper than
the baseline, while when ￿a falls from the baseline, the price of the b good rises,
implying that the a good is relatively cheaper.
Recognizing this is really all that is needed for understanding the result. Essen-
tially the government is like a consumer who has perfectly substitutable preferences
between the a good and the b good. What they want to do is provide households
with the most valued consumption bundle. They can do this by using their own
spending budget up on the most costly good. Thus for ￿a larger than the baseline,
the a good is relatively costly and spending on it leaves a more preferred consumption
bundle for consumers. Similarly, when ￿a is smaller than the baseline, the b good
is relatively more costly than its baseline price and the government can leave a more
preferred bundle for consumers by purchasing more of the b good.
An alternative way to see this is to work directly with implications from the









Since the Ramsey planner takes consumer optimization as given, this expression also
holds for the Ramsey planner. Next note that Corollary 1 says that for ￿a larger













































[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)






8An analogous argument holds for the ￿a <
￿a
1+￿a case and is left to the reader.
9Notice that the right hand side can be interpreted as the number of a goods that
can be obtained in the market for the b good reduction arising from the ￿a change.
The equation implies that a small increase in ￿a implies a b good reduction and an a
good increase which is such that the increase in a consumption is larger than would
be obtained through simple market trading. Again what is happening is that as ￿a
increases, the government gives up some b good which it trades back to the market to
buy more of the a good. However, because the a good is relatively costly, it cannot
buy very much, thus leaving more a good for consumers.9
Finally, an alternative way to visualize Corollary 2 is to consider Figure 1 which
plots utility values implied by the competitive equilibrium for alternative values of
￿a and ￿a when ￿a = 0:65, ￿b = 0:4, ￿ = 0:2, k = 35 and l = 25. If one holds
￿a constant, the cross section of Figure 1 shows a U shaped curve. This is to be
expected given the results of Corollary 1, part 2. What Corollary 2 concludes is
that because the cross section for any ￿a is U shaped, the Ramsey solution will be a
boundary value which is clear from Figure 1.10
9Other insights can be obtained by noting how the allocation of labor and capital given by (14),
(15), (16) and (17) change as one moves away from the baseline. These exercises are left to the
reader.




b = 0, then the optimal policy

































































































Figure 1: Log utility
ba da
4 Extensions to more general utility
When extending the model beyond the logarithmic utility, simple analytical results
for the Ramsey problem become infeasible. This arises because the expressions char-
acterizing elements of the competitive equilibrium are highly nonlinear and introduce
marginal conditions into the Ramsey planner￿ s ￿rst order conditions which do not
readily simplify. However, despite this limitation, it is still possible to investigate
extensions numerically by using the same routines that generated Figure 1.
We considered two extensions to the model. The ￿rst is for the consumption
arguments in utility to exhibit elasticities with each other that di⁄er from the unit
elasticity implied by logarithmic preferences and the second is for labor to exhibit
less than perfectly inelastic behavior. We formulated these extensions with a general
CES utility function given by
U(ca;cb;l) =
￿




c = ("2c 





and parameters are restricted according to 0 < "1 < 1, 0 < "2 < 1, ￿ ￿ 1 and   ￿ 1.
The parameter ￿ is related to the elasticity of substitution between the consumption
aggregate c and leisure and   is related to the elasticity of substitution between
the consumption levels ca and cb. In this formulation, larger values of ￿ and  
indicate greater rates of substitution while smaller values indicate greater levels of
complementarity.
Our investigation carried out a grid search procedure to ￿nd the optimal policy
values under the more general utility function. It was found that Corollary 1 did
not generalize completely, but was true in a local region near the optimum, while
Corollary 2, because it focused only on the optimal values, did generalize completely.
In particular, the part of Corollary 1 which claims that a U shaped curve will hold
for any value of ￿a was not always true for some elasticity values, but for ￿a near the
optimum the U shaped behavior was always present. Since our interest is in ￿nding
results about Ramsey type decisions, the generalization of Corollary 2 is what is most
important and leads us to conclude that the optimal policy will always occur at a
boundary where one or the other minimum expenditure constraint is binding.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a sample of the types of diagrams we found. These
are part of the investigation for the CES consumption good extension. Analogous
diagrams for the investigation of the elastic labor extension are not included here
because of their similarity to the inelastic labor case.11 Figures 2 and 3 are drawn for
  = :5 and   = ￿1:5 respectively while "2 = 0:5 and the other model parameters are
the same as those used in Figure 1. These curves are drawn so that attention can be
focused on the optimal policy outcome.12 The diagrams clearly show that for policy
values near the optimum, holding ￿a constant, produces a U shaped curve along the
￿a dimension. This shows that Corollary 1 does generalize in a local region near the
11These diagrams can be obtained from the authors upon request.




b = 0, the optimum values occur at ￿a = :245
and ￿a = 0 for the model in Figure 2 and ￿a = :555; ￿a = :335 and ￿b = 0 for the model in Figure 3.
12optimum. Furthermore, because of this U shaped behavior for local values of ￿a; we















































































































This paper investigated an extension to the Ramsey planning structure in which
the planner is able to choose the composition of its spending. Using a simple two
good static model with logarithmic preferences it was shown that such a planner
chooses boundary values for its own consumption. It was also shown that these
boundary solutions appear to be robust to more general utility formulations. In a
related dynamic model, Cassou, Gorostiaga, GutiØrrez and Hamilton (2006) also ￿nd
these boundary solutions. An intuitive interpretation for this result is o⁄ered which
suggests a planner ￿nds it attractive to allocate its sending toward the most costly
good. This intuitive interpretation supports the ￿nding that the result occurs in
analytically intractable settings with more general utility formulations or dynamic
environments.
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16A Appendix
This appendix goes through the proof of various propositions in the paper.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Because the production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale technology,
income equals GDP and can be written as
rk + wl = ya + pbyb:
The market clearing condition for the A good market implies that: ca = ya ￿ ga =




= (1 ￿ ￿a)ya:








yb = 2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a)ya;
which can be written as
￿bka + ￿akb = 2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a)￿bka: (23)
Using the capital market clearance condition (9), the amount of capital in sectors a
and b can be solved to get
ka =
￿a




[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a
k:
























[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b)
:
Finally, using (10) one can get
la =
(1 ￿ ￿a)




[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b)
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
l:
17A.2 Proof of Proposition 1









[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿(1￿￿a)
￿a (24)
yb = [2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]
￿
￿b





[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿(1￿￿b)
￿b
= [2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]y0
b: (25)











The market clearing condition for the j good implies that cj = yj￿gj = (1￿￿j)yj
for j = a;b. Using this along with (25) in (4) gives
U(ca;cb) = ln(1 ￿ ￿a) + ln(1 ￿ ￿b) + ln[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1] + lnya + lny0
b:



























We now evaluate each of the terms in this derivative beginning with the second
term. Begin by using (13) and gj = ￿jyj for j = a;b in (7) to get






Next, note that this implies
1 ￿ ￿b = 1 ￿ ￿ +
1
2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
￿a ￿
1
2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
￿ (27)
=
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
(1 ￿ ￿a):





￿b = ￿ ￿
1
2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
(￿a ￿ ￿):




2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1 ￿ (￿a ￿ ￿)(￿2)(1 + ￿a)
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]
2
= ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]
2;







[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]
:






[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a
￿￿a￿1 ￿
￿a2(1 + ￿a)￿b















(1 ￿ ￿a)2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)




















2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿
:







[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a
￿￿b￿1 ￿
￿b2(1 + ￿a)￿b















(1 ￿ ￿b)2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)























2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)2
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿


























2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)










2(1 + ￿a)(1 ￿ ￿b)2
[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)
￿
:




￿2[(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](￿b ￿ ￿a)
2
(1 ￿ ￿a)[[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1]￿b + ￿a][[2(1 ￿ ￿a)(1 + ￿a) ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿b) + (1 ￿ ￿a)]
:
20